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                                                    Abstract 
     This working paper examines the origins and development of the Ko￧ Group, which grew to 
be the largest business group in Turkey. This enterprise was an important actor in the emergence 
of modern business enterprise in the new state of the Republic of Turkey from the 1920s. After 
World War II it diversified rapidly, forming part of a cluster of business groups which dominated 
the Turkish economy alongside state-owned firms. This study shows how the founder of the 
Group, Vehbi Ko￧, formulated his business model, and analyzes how his firm evolved into a 
diversified business group.  The research supports prevailing explanations of business groups 
which identify the role of institutional voids, government policies and contact capabilities, but it 
also builds on and extends earlier suggestions in both the management and business history 
literatures that entrepreneurship needs incorporating more strongly as an explanatory factor. This 
working paper argues that Koç acted as both a Kirznerian and Schumpeterian entrepreneur to 
build his business group, both in its formative stages and later in its subsequent growth into a 
diversified group. 
  
Entrepreneurship and Business Groups: An Evolutionary Perspective on the Growth of the 
Koç Group in Turkey
1 
 
     1. Business groups in developing economies  
  Once greatly overlooked, there is now an extensive literature on business groups. It is 
well-established  both  that  they  are  a  prevalent  form  of  business  enterprise  across  much  of 
contemporary Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, and that they are highly heterogeneous. 
The  term  business  group  has  been  used  broadly  to  encompass  quite  different  organizational 
forms,  including  network-type,  diversified  and  pyramidal  groups,  even  if  most  research  has 
focused on “diversified” business groups that are active in technologically unrelated businesses.
2 
  There  remain  differences  between  academic  disciplines  in  the  dominant  theoretical 
explanations for the growth of  business groups. The market imperfections  theory favored by 
many economists and in Strategy has explained them as responses to the institutional voids that 
are commonly found in developing countries.
3 Political scientists have emphasized the role of 
government policies in targeting particular industries and sectors for growth through selective 
policies and giving special privileges to selected business group.
4 Some management researchers 
have identified the importance of the  “contact capabilities” of business groups, both with their 
home  government  and  also  with  the  multinational  enterprises  which  supplied  advanced 
technology.
5 
  A less-well developed insight concerns the role of entrepreneurship. In 2001 Kock and 
Guillen, employing an evolutionary perspective on the growth of business groups, suggested that 
the development of their “contact capabilities” should be seen as an entrepreneurial response to 
the environment of late industrializing countries. These authors argued that the protectionist environment  in  developing  economies  after  World  War  II  encouraged  entrepreneurs  not  to 
innovate new products, but rather to leverage local and foreign contacts to combine international 
knowledge with local markets. They also predicted that as economies liberalized and reduced 
tariff  barriers  entrepreneurs  would  shift  to  building  organizational  and  technological 
capabilities.
6 In 2006, in a study of the evolution of Taiwanese business groups, Chung also 
emphasized the role of entrepreneurial founders in diversification strategies. He suggested that 
the personal  relationships  of entrepreneurial founders, more especially  networks  in politics, 
shaped early diversification strategies, although over time the business groups developed their 
own capabilities which shaped later diversification patterns.
7 
  The business history literature on business groups has provided empirical support for all 
of the dominant theories of business group formation and growth. This research has certainly 
undermined the initial Kock and Guillen chronology by showing that busine ss groups were a 
vibrant form of business enterprise for a century before World War II, while finding no evidence 
to  support  a  view  that  they  declined  as  economies  liberalized.  Without  offering  formal 
generalizations, much of this literature has also lent  support  to  Chung’s  emphasis  on  the 
importance of entrepreneurial founders in the initial phases of business group formation. Indeed, 
by  identifying  the  role  of  successive  generations  of  family  owners  and  managers,  business 
historians  have  pointed  to  a  continuing  and  important  role  for  families  in  the  growth  and 
resilience  of  business  groups.  This  appears  to  be  as  true  for  the  families  behind  the  long-
established business groups owned in the developed economies of Britain and Sweden, such as 
the Swire’s, Keswick’s and Wallenberg’s, as for their counterparts in Latin America, India and 
other emerging markets.
8 
  This working paper looks at the historical evidence on Turkey, where the importance of business groups in the emergence of modern industry is well-established.
9 As Table 1 shows, out 
of  50 largest  businesses by employment in Turkey in 2005 ,  28  were  diversified  business 
groups.
10 These groups accounted for 57% of the total workforce of Turkey’s top fifty business 
enterprises. 
    Table 1 50 Largest Turkish Business Enterprises by Employment, 2005 
   
Source:  Adapted  from  Asli  M.  Colpan,  “Business  Groups  in  Turkey”,  in  Asli  M.  Colpan, 
Takashi Hikino and James R. Lincoln, eds.,  Oxford Handbook of Business Groups, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010. 
  Table 2 traces the origins of the 30 business groups that owned one or more of the 500 
largest  companies  in  Turkey  by  sales  in  1988.  The  table  shows  that  eight  of  these  large 
businesses originated in the interwar years, including Koç as well as Çukurova and Sabancı. This 
was not the norm. Of the eight largest business groups in 1988, besides Koç, Cukurova and 
Sabanci that emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, two emerged in the 1940s, two in the 1950s and 
one in the 1960s.
11 However, in terms of the 30 largest groups as a whole, Table 2 shows that 
Business enterprise
Total number Ratio (%)
Largest (Koç Group) 81,926 10.72
5 largest units 249,172 32.62
10 largest units 367,016 48.04
Family business groups (26 units) 389,124 50.94
All business groups (28 units) 436,235 57.10
State-owned enterprise 260,091 34.05
Foreign-owned enterprise 61,237 8.02
Total 50 units 763,946 100.00
Number of employeesalmost one-half of them emerged in the 1950s. 
 
  Table 2 Years of Foundation of the Largest Turkish Business Groups in 1988 
   
Source: Adopted from Ayse Buğra, State and Business in Modern Turkey: A Comparative Study, 
New York: State University of New York Press, 1994, pp. 57.  
Note: Decades denote the period that the business groups started their original businesses. The 
business groups shown above are the ones that control at least one of the 500 largest industrial 
firms listed by Istanbul Chamber of Industry in 1988. Overall the 30 business groups controlled 
more than 150 large industrial firms.  
  This working paper aims to go beyond this broad mapping of the chronological growth of 
Turkish business groups by exploring the dynamics of that growth through the case of the Koç 
Group  from  its  foundation  until  the  late  1980s.  Drawing  on  the  entrepreneurship  theories 
associated with Kirzner and Schumpeter,
12 this study explores the significance of entrepreneurial 
process, which it is argued  goes beyond the rudimentary contact capabilities and personalistic 
relationships suggested by Kock and Guillen and Chung. Further, and departing from the earlier 
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Altınyıldızwork, the present research points to a continuing and important role for entrepreneurship in the 
growth and resilience of the business group organization well after the initial formation stages. 
  To  assess  a  detailed  evolution  of  the  Koç  Group  that  has  been  described  by  several 
authors,
13 this working paper seeks to build on this evidence by utilizing more fine -grained data 
which mostly came from three resources. The primary sources were the Koç corporate archives, 
as well as interviews with the Koç family and retired and current managers.  The paper also 
draws on published autobiographies of Vehbi Koç, other Koç family members, and executives in 
the Koç Group as well as corporate histories of Koç group companies. These sources provide an 
element of trianglization. The paper adopts an in -depth qualitative case study method for its 
analysis. 
  Section 2 will briefly review the emergence of modern business in Turkey. Section 3 will 
discuss the origins of the Koç Group before 1945. Section 4 will examine the expansion of the 
Koç business group after World War II until the late 1950s. Section 5 analyzes the reorganization 
and further expansion of the Koç Group between the 1960s and 1980s. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  The Emergence of Modern Business in Turkey 
  Before the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire, a vast political entity spanning three 
continents,  including  the  much  smaller  modern  state  of Turkey,  had  a  substantial  handicraft 
industry, and as well as a powerful and well-organized state. During the nineteenth century, 
however,  the  Empire  struggled  to  adapt  to  the  Industrial  Revolution  underway  in  Western 
Europe. The ownership of the modest modern business sector was on ethnic and religious lines, 
with few Muslims involved in commercial activities.
14 The West’s political power partly shaped 
these developments. The so-called “capitulation” treaties, especially those from the early 19
th 
century, gave special privileges to Europeans and the non-Muslim minorities who lived in the Empire, primarily Greeks, Armenians and Jews. They had privileges in choosing European legal 
jurisdictions besides the Ottoman Islamic judicial system in disputes involving non-Muslims, 
such as in contracting and dispute resolution. They were also exempted from several taxes and 
paid  lower  custom  duties.
15  As the Ottoman Empire aimed to modernize itself during the 
Tanzimat (Reform) period (1839-1876), Muslim Turks could obtain jobs in the bureaucracy, and 
viewed  business  as  an  inferior  occupation.  The  overall  result  was  that  the  Turkish  Muslim 
majority were relatively absent in private business.
16 
  Table  3  shows  that  by  1913  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  far  behind  major  Western 
economies in terms of per capita GDP, and also behind latecomer economies such as Japan and 
Argentina. This remained the situation up to 1990. 
  Table 3 Per Capita GDP of Turkey and Selected Other Countries, 1870-1990 (in 1990 
  international Geary-Khamis dollars) 
   
Source: Compiled from Angus Maddison, “Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita 
GDP, 1-2006 AD”.www.ggdc.net/maddison, 2009. 
  After being defeated in World War I, the Ottoman’s vast empire in the Middle East was 
lost. The ethnic minorities which had dominated the modern business sector were expelled or 
1870 1913 1950 1970 1980 1990
Ottoman Empire/
Turkey
825 1,213 1,623 3,078 4,022 5,399
India 533 673 619 868 938 1,309
Japan 737 1,387 1,921 9,714 13,428 18,789
Argentina 1,311 3,797 4,987 7,302 8,206 6,433
Germany 1,839 3,648 3,881 10,839 14,114 15,929
USA 2,445 5,301 9,561 15,030 18,577 23,201marginalized.
17  
  After the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923, the new regime of Mustafa Kemal 
sought to  modernize the country. The creation of a business class from the now dominant 
Turkish Muslim majority of the population was a priority.  The government of the Republican 
People’s Party (RPP) provided financial incentives to private firms, including tax allowances and 
exemptions, and awarded customs exemptions for importing industrial machinery. Government 
policy moved toward more direct intervention following the onset of the Great Depression. High 
tariffs were imposed. State-owned enterprises were created to promote growth. Further measures 
were taken against non-Muslim citizens. A Wealth Levy of 1942 was enforced in practice by 
separating taxation rates based on the religious faith of the taxpayer, and represented a selective 
policy to dispossess non-Muslim businesses.
18 
  After World War II, which Turkey had stayed out of until almost the end, governments 
experimented with more liberal policies, especially after Adnan Menderes and  Democrat Party 
came to power in 1950 as the first democratically elected prime minister in the history of Turkey. 
However, policies soon shifted back towards increased state intervention.
19 The Foreign Capital 
Incentive Law was enacted in 1950 to encourage FDI, but in practice bureaucratic and legal 
complexities and hurdles resulted in few foreign firms entering Turkey.
20 The overall economic 
environment was highly volatile during this period up to the mid-1950s although GDP per capita 
rose steadily See Figure 1. 
     
 
 
 Figure 1   Turkish GDP Per Capita and GDP Growth, 1923-1990 
 
Source: Compiled and drawn based on Angus Maddison, “Statistics on World Population, GDP 
and Per Capita GDP, 1-2006 AD”, www.ggdc.net/maddison, 2009; revenue data provided by 
Koç Holding.  
Note: Real GDP per capita data is shown in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars. Real GDP 
growth is shown in percentages. 
  After 1960, when an army coup overthrew the government, policies were characterized 
by planned economic development with protectionist trade policies. Incentives were given to 
local firms to enter into the manufacturing sector, foreign exchange was allocated to favored 
industries, and state contracts were granted to enable construction and international trade. The 
policies were poorly implemented. By the 1970s there was soaring inflation. There was political 
turmoil with eight short lived coalition governments and two military coups in 1971 and 1980.
21   
Turkey had one of the lowest levels of FDI as a ratio of GDP in the world. It was not until 1980, when the country  faced critical macro-economic conditions, that a policy reversal began, as 
tariffs started to be lowered and other liberalization policies adopted.
22 Figure 2 shows the low 
ratio of exports and imports to GDP during most of the period, with the ratios moving upwards 
after 1980 as liberalization was put in place.  
    Figure 2   Turkish Exports and Imports as a Percentage of GDP, 1923-1990 
 
Source:  Compiled  from  statistical  data  (Yıllara  göre  dış  ticaret,  gayri  safi  yurti￧i  hasıla)  at 
Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu at www.tuik.gov. 
  The policy environment, therefore, provided the context for the emergence of Ko￧ as well 
as  other  business  groups.  Clearly,  however,  such  advantages  were  available  to  any  business 
within Turkey. Although Muslims were clearly favored, two of the largest groups created in the 
1950s, Alarko and Profilo, were Jewish. An important question, therefore, relates to explaining 
why it was Ko￧, and a handful of other firms, which seized them. 
3.  Vehbi Koç and the founding stages of the Koç Group 
   
           Vehbi Ko￧ was born in Ankara in 1901, which at the time was an impoverished city in the 
middle of Anatolia. At the time Ko￧ was born, his father was living on the rent he obtained from the stores left by his own father. In 1916, Ko￧’s father together with his three Muslim friends 
decided to found a partnership to trade wheat. When his father’s business failed, Ko￧ decided to 
enter into business himself and dropped out of school. Together with his father, they opened a 
small grocery shop selling shoe rubber, sugar, olives and pasta below their own house in 1917. 
After two years, Ko￧ started to investigate new businesses by looking at the businesses of his 
Greek, Armenian and Jewish neighbors.  As a result, he decided to enter into leather trading, and 
offered a high salary to an ethnic Greek salesman to provide the necessary expertise.
23 
  As he succeeded in the leather business, Ko￧ looked for new opportunities. He entered 
the  hardware  store  business,  which  was  largely  controlled  by  ethnic  Jewish  merchants,  and 
recruited a leading salesman from one of these Jewish enterprises. Over time the initial hardware 
business was expanded to include textiles, glassware and other products. He also sought to enter 
the large business of selling kerosene for gas lamps, and seeking to become the Ankara agent of 
an international company. After working successfully for the small business of the Anglo Persian 
Oil Company, he secured the Istanbul agency of the largest importer, Standard Oil.
24 
  As Ankara became the capital of modern Turkey, new business opportunities emerged, 
such as the development and construction work in the city. Given the increasing demand in those 
new businesses, Ko￧ entered into the sale of construction materials and exited the grocery and 
leather sales. He worked with a politically well-connected building contractor called Nafiz Kotan 
in the construction materials business, who was able to secure multiple government contracts. As 
Ko￧ grew in this business, he also built a contracting business undertaking projects in partnership 
with other firms.
25 In 1926, his father passed the ownership of their firm to Vehbi Ko￧, changing 
the enterprise’s name to Ko￧zade Ahmet Vehbi. 
  Ankara’s  new  prosperity  provided  other  opportunities.  During  the  1920s  US  firms including Ford and Chevrolet began their automotive sales in Turkey by using local agents that 
are primarily based in Istanbul. Koç observed that the representative of Chevrolet in Ankara had 
a profitable business bringing in automobiles from Istanbul. Thanks to his established reputation 
in Ankara, in 1928 Ford gave Koç an agency agreement when they searched an agent in that 
city.
26 Koç later hired an ethnic Jewish manager, Bernar Nahum, working at an automobile and 
parts business in Ankara at the time to build the automotive business. Ford, with the assistance of 
the government which agreed to charge no customs duties on the imported pa rts, started its own 
local assembly in Istanbul in 1929. Nevertheless, Ford closed the plant in 1934, as in the wake of 
the Great Depression, the hopes to develop an export business collapsed, and Turkish workers, 
fearing for their jobs, emptied boxes of a utomotive parts into the sea.
27 Koç retained the sales 
agency, Otokoç.  
  As  his  success  in  Ankara  grew,  Koç  opened  an  Istanbul  venture ,  organized  as  a 
partnership, for construction materials in 1937. Koç owned 70% of the company, and gave the 
rest of the shares to two other partners who would be the managers of the branch. As none of the 
partners spoke foreign languages Koç recruited İsak Atabef, who was an ethnic Jewish banker 
educated  and  worked  in  Germany,  and  at  the  time  was  working  for  a  successful  firm  in 
government contracts in Turkey. He also gave 15% of the equity out of his own shares to Atabef 
to make him a partner. He then took as a partner another competitor who was known as a good 
salesman to lead the sales of his Istanbul business, and also hired executives from two-state-
owned banks to join him by offering high salaries.
28 
  In 1938 Ko￧ turned his unincorporated company “Ko￧zade Ahmet Vehbi” in Ankara into 
an incorporated firm “Ko￧ Ticaret Anonim Şirketi” (Ko￧ Trade Corporation) with 300,000 lira 
($238,095) of capital. His two stores, one dealing with construction and electricity, and the other with automobiles, were organized as branches of Koç Trade Corporation. The partnership in 
Istanbul also turned into an incorporated company which became a branch of the Koç Trade 
Corp. in Ankara. Koç Trade Corp. was also being utilized as the financing vehicle of the various 
Koç businesses. 
  A key constraint on the growth of the business was a shortage of capital. The country 
lacked both a capital market and banks willing to make loans to promote industrial growth. With 
the outbreak of World War II however Koç decided to move into the truck importing business, 
for which there was a massive demand because of wartime shortages. A huge black market for 
vehicles emerged, as a result of which huge profits were made. Koç later lamented in public that 
“morality” had “deteriorated” with his organization. However there had also been significant 
capital accumulation.
29 
  The evidence on the formative stages of Ko￧’s group, then, confirms the conclusion of 
most business history research on business groups in general that all three leading theories have 
empirical  support.  Interwar  Turkey  had  plentiful  institutional  voids.  The  policy  regime  was 
clearly  favorable  to  the  emergence  of  domestic  business  groups.  The  importance  of  contact 
capabilities was clear as evidenced with Ko￧’s alliance with Nafiz Kotan in securing government 
contacts. 
  However the role of entrepreneurship has to be emphasized in explaining why it was Koç 
who created a business. The story is partly one of a Kirzner-type entrepreneur who was alert to 
opportunities. Koç was disadvantaged by not being in Istanbul, but successfully identified the 
new opportunities arising from Ankara’s becoming the capital of the new nation state. He also 
identified  that  the  ethnic  minorities  in  the  city,  especially  Jews,  were  knowledgeable  about 
business, knew foreign languages, and were vulnerable. He offered them high salaries and, more importantly, made them partners in his companies. 
  However Ko￧ was also a Schumpeterian entrepreneur. This was most evident in in Ko￧’s 
assembly as well as mobilization of financial resources. Capital scarcity was a huge constraint on 
the  development  of  modern  entrepreneurship.  Koç  accumulated  capital  in  the  Koç  Trade 
Corporation which it used to fund diverse businesses from construction to automobile agency to 
create an internal capital market. A large proportion of capital accumulation came from the 
commissions in import deals, especially during the distinctive circumstances of World War II.
30 
In a country which was short of capital and, especially, effective financial institutions and 
markets,  the  effective  assembling  and  mobilization  of  financial  resources  was   an  act  of 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship.  
4.  Growth as a diversified business group 1940s-1960s 
  This section now turns to the growth of Ko￧ as a diversified business group between the 
1940s and the 1960s. The policy regime of import protection and the obstacles to foreign firms 
provided the key exogenous context for the emergence and growth of multiple business groups. 
However it would be misleading to describe Vehbi Ko￧’s business strategy in functional terms as 
a  passive  response  to  policy  and  market  conditions.  The  strategy  was  proactive  and 
Schumpeterian. 
  In  particular,  he  began  a  lengthy  and  single-minded  pursuit  of  alliances  with  highly 
skeptical foreign multinationals. During 1943 Ko￧ became convinced that the Allies would win 
the war, and there would be many business opportunities with American firms. He sent to the 
United  States  a  young  man,  Vecihi  Karabayoğlu  who  was  an  engineer  with  an  American 
undergraduate degree. Karabayoğlu returned from the United States with the agencies of several 
firms, including General Electric (GE) and US Rubber.
31 In 1945, Ko￧ established a company by the name “Ram (Ko￧ in Turkish) Commercial Corporation”, with a capital of $25,000 in New 
York City, which was the first company to be established in the US. The primary business of the 
company was to provide consulting to Turkish official delegations visiting the U.S., which was 
closed in 1954.
32 
  In 1946 Ko￧ himself went to the United States to meet the executives of the firms that he 
represented  in Turkey,  and  to  persuade  them  to  invest  in  manufacturing  in  the  country.  He 
persuaded GE to establish a light bulb factory. GE Lighting was founded as the first joint venture 
with a foreign company in Turkey in 1948. Negotiations with US Rubber to build a tire factory 
were unsuccessful. Ko￧ also met with Ford executives in Detroit about creating a joint venture 
assembly operation. However Ford, which had serious troubles in its Western European business, 
had no interest in investing in developing countries, not least Turkey where its prior experience 
ended in a disaster.
33  
  As imports became increasingly restricted by high tariffs, Ko￧ remained doggedly in 
pursuit of a Ford assembly plant.
34 He found an opportunity to meet Henry Ford II, President of 
the Ford Motor Company, after his automotive agency won a dealership contest among the 34 
agencies of Ford in the Near East in 1956. Ko￧ carried a letter from the Prime Minister Menderes 
introducing Ko￧ and asking Ford to invest into Turkey jointly with him. Menderes also was 
offering to support the joint venture through incentives.
35 Ford eventually agreed to support the 
establishment of a truck assembly factory by providing a credit of up to $300, 000, although this 
came with highly demanding guarantee conditions and the proviso that the name Ford could not 
be used on the venture. However this time it was the Democratic Party government under 
Menderes  which  declined  to  support  the  initiative  which  f loundered  amidst  lengthy 
administrative delays. Ko￧ waited eight and a half months for a meeting with the Prime Minister to approve the agreement.
36 
  The Ford agreement had become entangled in the conflicted politics of postwar Turkey. 
Ko￧ had been loosely associated with the ruling political elite during the interwar years. In 1920 
he  became  a  member  of  Müdafaa-i  Hukuk  Cemiyeti  (Association  for  Defense  of  National 
Rights), the predecessor to the RPP, at his father’s request. He then regularly met with the RPP 
and government officials, including the second President of Turkey, İsmet İnönü as he became a 
well-known businessman. He was even invited to become the Representative for Ankara in the 
Turkish Parliament for the RPP in 1943, which he declined. The advent of the Democrat Party to 
government in 1950, therefore, was a problematic development. His businesses’ tax records were 
checked, and his business dealings were investigated in Parliament, even though no allegations 
of  corruption  or  anything  against  Ko￧  were  proven.  Government  ministries  stopped  buying 
gasoline and other goods from his companies. He was also removed from his position as the 
Ankara Chamber of Commerce President.
37 
  During the late 1950s the Democrat Party increased pressure on Ko￧ to join their party, as 
it wanted powerful business leaders on their side. Ko￧ did not want to leave RPP, not least that he 
felt any move would be interpreted that he was trying to get special favors or cover illegal 
business  dealings.
38  The delay  in the approval of the agreement with Ford was one of the 
casualties on this period. Eventually in early 1960 the pressure from the Democrat Party became 
so strong that Ko￧ had to resign from the RPP, without joining the Democrat Party.
39 This was a 
shrewd move as within months the Army had seized power, executing Prime Minister Menderes 
despite international uproar. For the next four decades, the Turkish Army remained the power 
broker in the country. Ko￧ never re -joined a political party, although he did seek to maintain 
good relations with new governments as well as the Army.
40   Despite his political travails, Ko￧ continued to seek a path into automobile assembly. In 
1958 he finally secured an agreement with the government under which an assembly plant could 
be established with Ford, though under strict conditions. Ford executives considered this venture, 
which involved no equity investment by the company and continued avoidance of the American 
company’s name, as a temporary project that would be unnecessary  when import restrictions 
were relaxed. In 1959 the Otosan company was launched, initially engaged which in the knock-
down assembly of Ford trucks. Ko￧ group companies and other Ford dealers in Turkey became 
shareholders  in  the  new  venture.
41  This was a mode st venture, certainly  compared to the 
automobile manufacturing facilities that Volkswagen had begun to construct in Brazil in response 
to market closure policies.
42 However it was Turkey’s first automotive assembly plant. In 1963 
Ko￧ explicitly noted the first mover advantages he believed would accrue to the first company to 
start an automotive industry.
43 
  Ko￧ became involved in domestic assembly and manufacturing more broadly from the 
mid-1950s onwards. Policy incentives to private enterprises to move into  manufacturing and 
growing protectionism provided the exogenous context, yet Ko￧ was creative and ambitious in 
his pursuit of partners. He sought to enter steel furniture manufacturing in 1954 with the Burla 
family, who were ethnic Jews who owned an established steel trading business. As incomes rose 
and the demand for white-goods expanded, and there were not enough supply of such goods as 
washing machines and refrigerators, Ko￧ and his partners decided to make an agreement with a 
Belgian company for technical assistance in 1959. They bought motors, gearboxes and other 
parts to make washing machines. The company, then named “Ar￧elik”, was able to make an 
agreement with Amcor, an Israeli company, to receive technical assistance and purchase parts for 
the manufacturing of refrigerator in late 1959, after the initial attempts for licensing and know-how  agreements  with  US  and  European  firms  including  GE  and  Siemens  failed,  as  those 
companies saw the local Turkish market to be too small.
44 
  Difficulties in importing key components prompted Ar￧elik to look for ways to produce 
components  for  the  white-goods  business  within  Turkey.  The  company  initially  began  to 
manufacture plastic plates and gearboxes themselves as there were not any qualified suppliers 
which could provide these to Ko￧ in the country. For more sophisticated parts, Ar￧elik made 
agreements with multinational firms, including technology licenses from GE and German-based 
Bosch-Siemens. Ar￧elik soon diversified. Due to the fluctuations in the domestic market for 
home  appliances,  the  company  used  their  steel  plates  to  make  other  products,  including 
harvesters and steel bathtubs.
45 
  At one level, then, Ko￧’s growth in diversified assembly and manufacturing businesses 
can be explained by policies which provided incentives for profitable entry into such activities. 
Rising incomes provided a demand which the low industrialization of the country could not 
meet. At another level, the way such opportunities were seized needs to be seen as Schumpeter-
style entrepreneurship. He was not so much alert to new opportunities, as creating them. Ko￧ 
perceived how to capture value by acquiring knowledge from the multinational firms who were 
shut out of the market, but were not especially interested in entering it as it was considered small, 
marginal and risky. He was relentless in pursuing and negotiating with those international firms. 
When Ko￧ could not persuade such firms to partner with him, he pursued the innovative gambit 
of seeking knowledge from innovative firms in the newly created state of Israel. Ko￧ also did not 
appear to be a rent-seeker benefiting from political contacts. Indeed, he suffered from being 
affiliated  with  the  political  party  which  had  lost  power,  and  subsequently  carefully  avoided 
explicit political affiliation whilst remaining on good terms with the power brokers in the regime.  
5.   Reorganization and expansion 1960s to 1980s 
  The rapid growth of the Ko￧ Group between the 1960s and the 1980s saw attempts to 
build organizational capabilities, although the search for ideal organizational model to manage 
such a diversified business proved challenging. This section highlights Ko￧ to change laws that 
stood against the organizational form he envisioned. It also shows Vehbi Ko￧’s s role in search 
for a best administrative mechanism and the making of organizational innovations within the 
Group. Now owner and manager of a large business enterprise, then, Ko￧ continued to function 
as a disruptor of established legal norms and organizational methods, although he continued to 
play critical roles in the strategies of the Holding and its operating companies. 
Creating a Holding Company 
  The number of Ko￧ companies increased from the early 1960s. They were nominally 
independent  firms  in  which  Vehbi  Ko￧  personally  was  the  dominant  voice  in  strategic 
decisions.
46 The managerial diseconomies of this strategy soon became apparent as he struggled 
to manage unrelated businesses, including preventing duplication of service functions. Ko￧, who 
was sixty-four in 1965, also began to consider his legacy. He was concerned that his successors 
might struggle to manage his personal creation, which had become a complex business entity 
involving multiple outside shareholders.
47 
  These challenges were hardly unique to Turkey. Indeed, they had been faced decades 
previously as firms in the United States and Europe had begun to grow. By this period there was 
a substantial body of management theory addressing the issues, especially in the United States. 
In 1960 Filiz Ofluoğlu, a female human resources manager in Ko￧ companies, who held an MBA 
from Wharton and a doctorate from Columbia University, suggested the creation of a holding company.
48 Ko￧ asked the American consulting firm of George Fry and the Associates to prepare 
a report on the concept, and it suggested a plan, to incorporate Ko￧’s companies within a central 
holding company.
49 
  By  the  time  of  the  consultancy  report,  there  was  already  an  embryonic  headquarters 
structure in place in the form of the Ko￧ Trade Corp, which had evolved as a management and 
monitoring centre. The building of the company was appropriately named “Central Inn”. An 
initial idea was to change this company into a company that would hold the shares of several 
other Ko￧ companies.
50 The Ko￧ family would transfer their shares in the several operating 
companies to the newly established holding company, which would then become the shareholder 
of the operating companies. Ko￧ also planned to allocate shares to senior managers in the 
holding company. To balance the family’s majority ownership in management, Ko￧ also wanted 
to give certain shares of the holding company to a foundation under his name.
51 
  The creation of such a holding company faced considerable challenges from the Turkish 
legal system. Turkey had a multiple taxation law which taxed corporate income when a firm 
transferred profits to a parent firm. This meant that when an affiliate transferred profits to a 
holding company, the same profit would be taxed twice. In addition, Turkish Civil Law did not 
appear to allow the establishment of the kind of foundation that Ko￧ envisioned. The upshot was 
that  Ko￧  needed  to  lobby  to  get  laws  either  changed  or  clarified.  In  1961  the  government 
legislated to remove the danger of double taxation. Six years later a law was passed permitting 
the establishment of foundations passed in 1967.
52 
  As changes to the law were pursued, it was eventually decided that Ko￧ Trade Corp. 
would remain as it was, and that another company, “Ko￧ Holding”, would be established, in 
November 1963. Ko￧ Holding became the first such holding company established in the country, although in time other business groups also adopted this structure.
53 Vehbi Ko￧ himself was the 
largest shareholder with 73.7% of the equity, with the remaining majority held by his wife, and 
each of his four children. With the passing of the law on foundations in 1967, Ko￧ establish ed 
the Ko￧ Holding Foundation which was a pension fund for employees, which also invested in the 
holding company.
54  In 1969 the Vehbi Ko￧ Foundation was also established to handle the 
philanthropic contributions of the Ko￧ family. This also took equity in the holding company.
55 
  In 1965 the new Holding Company assumed ownership of 28 Ko￧ companies, organized 
into an automotive group, an industry group, a trading group, and an LPG group.
56 Subsequently 
the  Group  grew  mainly  or ganically  but  also  by  acquisitions.  It  engaged  in  both  related 
diversification to produce components necessary for manufacturing operations, such as the 
creation of an alloy steel plant and a foundry to cast engine blocks, and technologically unrelated 
areas, including canned food, supermarket chains, foreign trade, banking and insurance, and 
meat processing. While the former decisions of related diversification mainly hinged on group’s 
resources, the latter especially did on Vehbi Ko￧’s entrepreneurship. F or example, when Ko￧ 
visited Japan in 1969 and saw the role of large trading companies, he thought that a similar 
export and import company would be a significant asset for the Ko￧ Group.  He established Ram 
Dış Ticaret (Ram Foreign Trade) in 1970 .
57 Ko￧ also decided to acquire the majority of the 
shares of Migros Turk in 1975 when a director of Migros Turk approached him in 1974 as the 
company decided to exit due to economic and political instability.
58 Ko￧’s decision came despite 
the group executives, who were alarmed that price controls would cause losses, opposed such a 
move.
59 
  Ko￧  drew  particular  attention  to  the  nature  of  the  domestic  market  to  justify  such 
diversification in his autobiography, published in 1983:   Turkey  is  a  small  country  relative  to  the  world’s  developed  countries.    Here,  it  was 
  difficult to grow doing business in one field as it is done in big countries.  Our economic 
  and  political  status  has  continuously  shown  ups  and  downs.  If  one  business  made  a 
  deficit, the other would make a profit, and as such I acted in thinking that I would make 
  balance.
60 
  The number of companies in the Ko￧ Group increased from 28 in 1965 to 92 in 1988, 
while  the  product  groups  also  increased  from  four  to  seven.  The  three  automotive  related 
businesses, Tofaş, Otosan and automotive supplies, stood as the largest of the Ko￧ businesses in 
terms of total sales before 1990. See Table 4 which shows sales ratios by activity.
61 
    Table 4 Ko￧ Consolidated Sales by Activities, 1972-90 (% of total) 
   
Source:  Compiled  and  calculated  from  Ko￧  Holding  Annual  Reports,  1976-90  and  reports 
provided by Ko￧ Holding, Ko￧ Holding Archives. 
Note:  The  table  shows  figures  from  year  1972  which  is  the  first  year  consolidated  data  is 
available. The  LPG  group  is  renamed  as  Energy  group  in  figures  for  1980  and  afterwards. 
1972 1975 1980 1985 1990
Automotive 57.2 52.4 53 44 45
Industry 27.1 28.6 31
Commerce 8.1 8.4 6
LPG 7.6 7.1 9
‐ ‐ ‐ 11 10
Financial and Foreign
xxTrade Companies
45 45
Koç Investment and
xxMarketing Company
‐ 3.6 1 ‐Financial and Foreign Trade companies include Ko￧ Investment Company.  In 1985 and 1988 
figures,  industry,  commerce  and  energy  group’s  figures  are  combined,  as  the  companies 
belonging to those groups have been gathered under a new presidency called the “Industrial, 
commercial and energy companies’ presidency. 
  Ko￧ used the earnings from individual group companies to provide equity capital for 
newly established companies in new business fields. Ko￧ family members would also personally 
invest in such businesses, which served as a signaling device to outside investors.
62 A complex 
web of cross- ownership structures emerged as a result. The provision of capital for new ventures 
was  another  classic  example  of  a  business  group  filling  an  institutional  void.  The  country 
continued to lack a modern organized stock exchange market until 1985, when the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange  was  established  after  a  major  scandal  concerning  brokerage  firms.
63  The banking 
system before the mid-1980s also focused on short-term credit finance rather than longer-term 
industrial investment.
64 
Group administration 
  In its initial establishment in 1963, the function of the Holding company was seen as 
assisting in the formulation of the corporate strategies and execution of the operating companies, 
as well as controlling and monitoring their budgets. Vehbi Ko￧ and two key managers, occupied 
the  core  of  the  decision  making  in  the  Management  Council  (later  to  be  named  Board  of 
Directors) of the Holding.
65 A retiree from Sümerbank, a state-owned enterprise established in 
1933 to create and manage diverse industrial businesses, including weaving, mining, cellulose, 
ceramics, and chemistry, was brought in as a lateral hire to be General Coordinator (later to be 
named  President  and  then  CEO)  to  assist  in  administrative  matters.
66  The  Holding  top 
management was involved in key strategic decisions of the operating companies. Vehbi Ko￧ continued to have the last say in critical decisions.
67 
  The following decade saw a search for structures which would systematize the chain of 
command, and clarify the authority of each “commanding member” across the entire Group. In 
1970 an Executive Committee was formed to mark the first formal operational division of labor 
within the Holding. The task of the Executive Committee was to execute the decisions that the 
Management Council had made and to follow up the consequences of such decisions. It also 
coordinated the relationships between the Holding Company and operating affiliates.
68 Rahmi 
Ko￧, the only son of Vehbi, became the first President of the Executive Committee .
69 In 1971, 
Ko￧ formed an office of planning coordination for establishing long-term (five year) plans for 
the  whole  group.
70  The  following  year  Ko￧   set  up  a  “Family  Council”,  which  was  an 
administrative mechanism he developed that included both himself and his four children. This 
council was established to discuss the strategies of the Ko￧ group at the family level on a weekly 
basis.
71  
  The first organization chart of the Ko￧ Holding was drawn in 1973 (see Appendix Figure 
1), which omitted the Family Council by design.
72 The organization chart was clearer than the 
reality. For instance, while the Industry Group (or division) was responsible for the production of 
white-goods together with other industrial activities of Ko￧, the Trade Group (or division) was 
responsible  for  the  marketing  of  some  of  the  white-goods  and  other  goods  as  well  as 
international trade. On the other hand, the Automotive Group included auto manufacturing and 
auto marketing companies under its own Group, but Ko￧ Investment and Marketing Company 
under the Trade Group also marketed the Automotive Group’s products.
73 
  Two further organizational developments followed. First was the establishment of Group-
wise  Research  and  Development  (R&D)  Center,  pioneered  by  Bernar  Nahum,  then  Vice-Chairman of Ko￧ Holding, in 1973. This was the first private sector R&D Center in Turkey, 
which engaged in incremental technological innovation to adapt foreign technologies to local 
circumstances.  Its  main  task  was  to  support  the  automotive  and  industry  groups  in  design, 
engineering,  technical  consulting,  optimization,  knowledge  sharing  and  future  research 
directions. In practice, it mostly worked for the automotive group, due to Nahum’s expertise in 
that business.
74 
  In  1982  the  Ko￧  Holding  Training  and  Development  Center  was  founded,  whose 
establishment was originally put forward by one of the human resource managers in the Holding. 
This Center, whose function was to develop managers in different Ko￧ companies, was the first 
attempt  in  Turkey  to  provide  executive  education  within  a  business.  Ko￧  sought  to  nurture 
trained personnel for executive positions within his own organization. Again, it was a classic 
example of filling an institutional void. The teaching of management education had begun in 
Turkish universities by the 1970s, although primarily at the undergraduate level. Graduate level 
training, or executive education, was minimal.
75 
  Ko￧’s  investment  in  research  and  development  and  management  education  was 
pioneering in Turkey, although over time the other large business groups followed. However 
there was no rapid Americanization of the management system, even as policy liberalization took 
hold. Vehbi Ko￧ remained firmly in control as the unconditional authority for the whole group in 
the 1980s, with key strategy-formulation processes and decision-making mechanisms left in the 
hands of the family.
76 
  Ko￧ was interested in the management of the family-owned businesses of his partners, 
including Siemens, Ford and Fiat, and by the late 1980s had begun to believe that professional 
salaried managers could play an important role in a family business, which they did not in his own firm. In 1988 he hired another American management consultancy, Bain & Company, to 
advise on the changes in organization and strategy required if the Ko￧ Group was to flourish 
during Turkey’s potential transition to a more open economy.
77 Given that the need to focus on 
core competences and a void unrelated diversifications had become the mantra of American 
management thought during the 1980s, Ko￧ received advice that was both predictable and 
predicted when the firm was hired. Bain recommended reducing the range of businesses in which 
Ko￧ was involved, and further restructuring of the organization, especially clearly defining roles 
and  responsibilities  from  the  Board  down  to  the  operating  company  managers,  and  the 
empowering individual product divisions and business units. Bain also predictably suggested the 
appointment of a professional CEO.
78 
  The Bain report was not acted up. Few businesses had been sold by the time Vehbi Ko￧ 
died in 1996. There was little progress in the professionalization of top management. The family 
continued  to  take  active  roles  in  decision-making  of  the  strategies  of  the  Holding  and  its 
operating companies as well as the execution.
79 During that year Vehbi’s daughter Suna wrote a 
letter to the Family Council saying “In the coming years, because of increased competition and  
(Turkey’s entry into EU) Customs Union on the one hand, and on the other hand because of 
problematic governments, Ko￧ Holding will face much more varied troubles. This necessitates a 
very  professional  and  high  quality  management.”
80  It  was  four  years  later   that  the  first 
professional manager was appointed as chief executive of the Group. 
  Ko￧ was evidently better at creating a diversified business group than dealing with the 
resulting considerable organizational challenges. The 2005 data cited at the start of this working 
paper also shows that Ko￧ was the largest of the Turkish business groups, although it shared with 
the other firms in the four largest business groups a similar level of unrelated diversification.
81 Among  these  groups,  Ko￧  pioneered  the  Holding  Company  concept,  the  centralized  R&D 
facility, and the investment in management education, although the other groups followed his 
example, either directly or through acting on the advice of their own management consultants.
82 
Ko￧ remained typical of Turk ish business in his unwillingness to cede family control at the 
highest levels of the Group, even though he sought out American management knowledge 
through hiring consultants, although did little to follow their advice. 
  Whatever  the  merits  or  otherwise  of  the  Group’s  existing  management  structure,  the 
performance of the business was quite good. Table 5 shows that while return on sales and return 
on assets fluctuated between 1972 and 1990, the return on equity steadily improved. 
Table 5 Financial Performance of the Ko￧ Group at Benchmark Years, 1972-90 
 
Source:  Compiled  and  calculated  from  Ko￧  Holding  Annual  Reports,  1976-90  and  reports 
provided by Ko￧ Holding, Ko￧ Holding Archives. 
The financials in this table reveal a business that was conservatively managed and operated with 
low debt levels. Evidently there were no pressing financial incentives for Ko￧ to rush to follow 
the recommendations of Bain and (then) fashionable American management theory.   
6.  Conclusion  
  This study of the emergence of the Ko￧ business group confirms many of the prevailing 
1972 1975 1980 1985 1990
Return on sales 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.11
Return on assets 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.32
Return on equity n.a. 0.44 0.70 1.02 1.49
Current assets-current liabilities ratio n.a. 1.40 1.27 1.20 1.49
Debt-equity ratio n.a. 2.81 5.54 4.83 2.81theories explaining the growth of business groups, although a single case study naturally is not 
intended to serve as a “test” of such theories. Twentieth century Turkey was a textbook case of 
institutional void in an emerging market. There were weakly developed capital markets, banks 
focused  on  short-term  credit,  and  there  was  a  scarcity  of  skilled  management.  Government 
policies provided a broadly favorable context for the growth of domestic business groups. State 
construction contracts were important for the initial growth of the Ko￧ business. Ko￧ was one of 
the recipients of the import exemptions and other incentives designed to  nurture indigenous 
business. The  new  Republic  of Turkey  constrained  the  ethnic  and  non-Muslim  communities 
which had previously dominated modern business, giving opportunities to Muslim entrepreneurs. 
Protectionism and bureaucratic obstacles on inward FDI meant that foreign multinationals which 
wished to sell in Turkey had little option but to form licensing and other agreements with local 
companies. However the case of the Ko￧ does challenge assumptions that government policies 
were always supportive. Governments are not homogeneous, and in the case of Ko￧, there were 
periods when they were as much an obstacle as a benefit. 
  The story of the growth of the Ko￧ Group can certainly be told in conventional terms of 
business  groups  of  building  contact  and  organizational  capabilities.  Evidently  administrative 
mechanisms  were  developed  over  time.  However  such  terms  hardly  capture  the  reality  of 
developing a large business in a volatile environment. Indeed, this study builds on the insights of 
Kock  and  Guillen  and  Chung  that  entrepreneurship  needs  to  be  incorporated  into  the 
determinants of business group growth, especially to account for why particular entrepreneurs 
built such groups while others, faced with similar exogenous conditions, did not. Moving beyond 
the personalistic networks and contact capability functions in the entrepreneurial process, the 
working paper finds evidence both of Kirzner-style entrepreneurship of being alert to the new opportunities offered by the Republic, and Schumpeterian-style disruption and creation of new 
opportunities. 
  In the founding stages of the group Ko￧ showed himself alert to the new opportunities 
created by government policies, and to his location in Ankara. He extensively reached out to 
ethnic  minorities  to  build  managerial  expertise  His  assembly  and  mobilization  of  financial 
resources was Schumpeterian. However, and departing from previous studies that emphasized 
the role of entrepreneurial process in the initial phases of group formation, the continued growth 
of the Ko￧ Group demonstrated the continued importance of entrepreneurship during the postwar 
decades. Ko￧ proactively sought to attract technological expertise from established businesses in 
the United States and Europe, which had little motivation to invest in Turkey, and when he could 
not entice such firms, he sought other partners in Israel. It is superficial to label Ko￧’s search for, 
and negotiation, of such diverse partnerships solely as “contact capabilities.” As he sought to 
make desired organizational innovations, Ko￧ lobbied to change the legal framework of Turkish 
business. Ko￧ also took the lead in Turkey in disrupting and changing traditional organizational 
methods, whilst he stayed behind the significant moves of his Group through the 1990s. 
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